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Emily Dickinson’s famous poem of social critique, “Much madness is divinest sense,” echoed a
sentiment that had a large, transcendent influence on my own understanding of madness.1 Dickinson’s
assertion that madness has been continually stigmatized due to the dichotomy between ‘reason’ and the
dangerous, animalistic state of ‘unreason’ remains one shared by at least some Enlightenment scholars
of centuries past. However, this idea has been relatively unfounded amongst most of the renowned
historians within the discourse today, such as Michel Foucault and Roy Porter. These scholars only
sparingly acknowledged the idea of some underlying relationship between the “mad” and society. To
name a few, these historians tend to focus on personal nuances to present arguments within the
discourse, such as those about power relations within societal hierarchies supporting the scrutinization of
madness, in Foucault’s case, or simply retelling the history of madness with no care to outline any
complex relationship between society and the mad themselves, in Porter’s case. For the most part, these
same historians have ignored subsequent questions stemming from the proposed relationship, the most
important of those being: How did society come to perceive this relationship over time, and how has it
developed in various civilizations from different eras throughout the recorded history of Western
Europe? What is “madness” if society cannot create a stable definition or idea that endures and persists
throughout recorded history? Is madness perhaps an indefinable, metaphysical concept that will forever
remain part of western society’s continually transforming lexicon?
Upon making the discovery that most of the present scholarship surrounding this discourse had
inadvertently avoided these queries, I sought to answer three primary questions that are meant to
supplement the current scholarship, however, they are also my attempt to fill any remaining holes or
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discrepancies within the discourse: What are the major paradigm changes in the perceptions of madness
within varying periods throughout the recorded history of Western Europe, why did these shifts in
thought arise and what effects did they have on the relationships between the mad and the rational, and
most importantly what is madness as a social, biological, and psychological concept?
To the first two questions concerning the changing periods of thought, I argue that there have
been four major periods of paradigm change towards the construction of ‘madness’ within the recorded
history of Western Europe. Each shift seemed to come about in direct relation to changing thought
surrounding reason and the value of the human mind according to some semblance of unified thought
across nearly all regions of Western Europe. My argument answering the last and most important
question, however, grew to be quite complicated, thus requiring a more complex explanation. Madness
itself remains an indefinable and uncertain concept that scholars can merely theorize about but never
truly understand through a metaphysical, much less historical lens. The relationship between the “mad”
and a “rational society” mirrors closest to Michel Foucault’s theory—explained in one of the paragraphs
below—but still differs in the way that I believe inherent human nature incites society to shut away and
push aside all that is unknown or unfathomable to them. This, in turn, also causes those with—rather
loosely defined ”reason” to unconsciously set themselves apart from those who exhibit animalistic
tendencies of “unreason.” Thereby, this conflict forever perpetuates an unbreakable opposition between
the two, bound by the idea of a desired normality. In many ways, it simply remains a human construct as
opposed to what Foucault and other scholars argue as a complex social construct upheld by a hierarchy
of power.
To develop and support my thesis throughout this paper, I first attempt to take the previous
historiography surrounding madness—along with my initial thoughts when undertaking this project—in
order to argue for a preliminary concept of what we know as madness. This allows for some background
context as well as framing the paper leading up to my discussion of the paradigm changes throughout
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various key periods in the recorded history of Western Europe. Explaining these paradigm changes, why
they took place, and how they fit within the historical context of the periodized eras will help to better
understand the preliminary concept while continuing to build upon it. Finally, I will close the paper by
re-approaching that preliminary concept while synthesizing the newly-found information to discuss the
meanings and relationships—between society and the mad—hat lay within the continually shifting
concept of madness, one that continues to perplex historians.
Parameters, Periodization, and Methodological Framework of the Research
Before delving into the bulk of the paper, I feel it is most appropriate to preface the research
ahead with a few disclaimers, an explanation of omissions, deliberately narrowed parameters, and the
like. It should first be noted that my periodization is unorthodox compared to many other projects of this
magnitude. Madness throughout recorded history contains a broken temporal framework paired with a
general lack of primary sources that have survived the test of time. As such, historians primarily work
with secondary sources or other popular, primary works that have been re-published over time such as
the Hippocratic Corpus. However, these are generally still few and far between with fictional literature
and film now superseding historical sources in controlling the brunt of work within the discourse
surrounding madness. This combination makes periodizing madness in such a small frame of time—say,
madness in the asylums of Victorian England from the 1880’s to the 1890’s—virtually impossible due to
a lack of sources necessary to create a sufficiently detailed and lengthy paper. This is made even more
difficult by the fact I have come to realize that something as psychologically complex as madness
remains difficult to place within a single time period, particularly in a vacuum. Madness, in any sense of
the word or concept, transcends small periods of time with its complexities and various nuanced
understandings. I also came upon the realization that it remains best to study and understand madness
comparatively between eras of thought that produced competing and evolving perceptions of madness.
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With that said, an explanation of the timeline that I chose to use is needed to understand the
periods I discuss later in this paper. Roy Porter, one of the most renowned and accomplished writers
within the discourse surrounding madness, argued that the relative idea of ‘madness’ may be as old as
man itself, considering the archaeological evidence of fossilized skulls with holes bored in them by
ancient flint tools. This was a tradition that continued for centuries, evolving even into the Age of the
Asylum and one that is evidenced in the picture here, on the left side of the page.2 With that said, the
present field lacks in sources and evidence if one
were to focus on a narrow time frame when
researching madness, as evidenced in writers like
Michel Foucault and Roy Porter writing projects
that span centuries. Porter, himself, even admitted
the general lack of sources for madness to be
focused into a short span of research.
Understanding and acknowledging this, I made the
decision to take the same route as Foucault and Porter in researching long periods of time while
periodizing the eras of paradigm changes in thought towards madness. This is best represented in the
Annales school’s “longue duree” historical methodology. In an effort to make the time spans of research
more reasonable, I attempt to focus specifically on the concept of madness and its relation to society
during the time of my research instead of adopting a temporal framework where I might focus on change
directly over time.3 This lens allowed me to focus on long-term, slowly evolving historical structures
with the intention of drawing conclusions from larger historical trends and patterns. By periodizing my
research into four distinct eras of change, I allowed myself to look at cause-and-effect over large periods
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of time while not overloading the paper with information that would inevitably seem insignificant in
relation to the length of history researched.
Lastly, to also narrow the paper’s scope to a reasonable status considering the large span of time
that I periodize throughout the paper, I focus solely on major centers of western European thought;
particularly the territories of what would become modern-day England, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, and
Germany. This is not for a lack of care towards other nations and territories, rather the larger and more
affluent territories such as the aforementioned ones simply supply more evidence as to how the concept
of madness developed over time. Just as well, certain eras focus on reasonably specific areas due to the
influence that certain civilizations had on the development of madness. For instance, the first era of
paradigm change discussed in a later paragraph entails classical theory and the age of Hippocratic
medicine where the classical Greek and Roman worlds are relatively the only areas discussed due to
their contributions to the medical field far outweighing any other civilization at the time. Likewise, some
eras require no direct focus on area, as for the most part all areas of Western Europe generally follow the
same concepts concerning madness. Also, I see no reason to gender the research in this paper as, for the
most part, madness remained evenly split amongst males and females for most of the history presented
below. As such, this is not for a lack of care towards any areas or peoples, it merely remains a way for
me to reasonably narrow the scope of my research while supplying the most complete and objective
history possible of paradigm changes within the discourse surrounding madness.
Preliminarily Defining Madness and the Problems That Arise
Madness: the state of being mentally ill, exhibiting extremely foolish behavior, perpetual state of
frenzied, erratic, or chaotic behavior. These are just some ways that the western world has attempted to
officially define this seemingly elusive phenomenon. However, madness throughout recorded history
transcends mere raw definitions. Before delving into the periods of change in the construction of
madness and its relationship with society, it is appropriate to make an attempt at defining madness as a
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historical concept, primarily based on the present
historiography and what I have seen in my research
thus far. Then, and only after objectively looking at
the history of paradigm changes towards the
construction of madness, I will construct my own
idea of madness according to the research that this
paper encompasses. It is only with attempting to
make a base-concept around madness that a
historian can then move on to explain its history.
Madness has and will continue to be a nearly impossible concept to study, define, and delineate
societal relationships that stem through it. This is not only due to the size and scope of the innumerable
cases of madness throughout recorded history in tens of thousands of societal histories. Madness is so
difficult to define and wrap our minds around because, as Renaissance historian Carol Neely argues,
most history surrounding madness is a “black hole” marked with many hiatuses while madness, in
essence, is an absence of the human “self.”4 In a way, this makes madness quite a difficult concept for
historians to discuss, much less come to a universal definition or understanding of madness’
implications as a “disease” or serious problem. A major part of this issue is the standing historiography
surrounding the discourse of madness and the many nuances and disagreements that historians have
continually taken towards each other and towards the concept of madness itself. With that said, it is
important to outline a very brief, present historiography to understand a proper concept of madness for
the time-being until it is discussed at length, in my own thoughts, towards the end of this paper.
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Admittedly, while the historiography obviously contains many scholars and their thoughts, the
two primary arguments towards the conception of madness throughout history can be boiled down to the
followers of Michel Foucault’s early poststucturalist arguments and the followers of Roy Porter’s
sociological arguments. Concerning the former, it can be argued that renowned French philosopher
Michel Foucault was and remains the forerunner for the modern discourse surrounding perceptions of
madness throughout recorded history. Foucault’s underlying thesis did not concern a broad history of
madness but was instead focused on the notion and symbol of what he calls “power-knowledge.”5
Foucault’s understanding was that systems of authority in science, psychology, and philosophy as well
as systems of power in institutions of justice and discipline are inextricably linked and equally
responsible for how society functions, which includes how “madness” is perceived and treated. Focusing
on a key event that shaped this thinking, the “Great Confinement” proved to him that madness was
something shut away from the world in “houses of confinement” where the combined forms of reason
and judicial authority were exercised to punish the mad.6 Being mad was loosely defined and most of
those condemned were hardly mentally ill. In fact, in most cases, the condemned were simply
impoverished, small-time criminals, or otherwise deemed degenerates of sorts.7 If it was not obvious to
the audience already, madness was entirely a social construct due to the inconsistencies of imprisoning
the mad. Just as well, to Foucault, madmen seemed to evoke a hidden knowledge, reason, and something
that threatened those in power while the concept of madness itself was constructed in a period that
valued normality, work efficiency, and reason while punishing animality and unreason.8
While the immediate response to the poststructralist view of the history of madness was met with
equal respect, and in some cases more additive poststructuralist perspectives, the turn of the 21st century

Michel Foucault, History of Madness, edited by Jean Khalfa, translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (New York:
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brought social histories into the fold starting with Roy Porter’s universally respected Madness: A Brief
History. The poststructuralist view, for many historians, lacked a delicate approach to socially-accepted
views of madness and in particular a view of the mentalities within various societies and eras that caused
madness to be viewed in the ways that it was. Porter intended to track both the historical and
historiographical background of madness as they had been perceived in various institutions, societies,
and eras. Instead of attempting to decode the symbol and construction of ‘madness’ as Foucault and his
contemporaries did, Porter outlined a slightly more chronological history while focusing on sociological
aspects of madness. Curiously enough, however, the actual relationships between society and the mad
were lost on both sets of scholars.
Porter desired to know how and why societies viewed madness in the various ways that they did,
and as opposed to Foucault he was not concerned with any ambiguity towards madness, instead taking it
for face-value.9 Just as well, Porter tracked who the ‘mad’ were, why they were treated as the ‘other’,
and what effects this had on them through a mentalités-oriented lens.10 Finally, Porter primarily
criticized the poststructuralist vie—-and Foucault himself—for writing not about madness as the
disease, the societal issue, and its treatment, but rather wrongly “of questions of freedom and control,
knowledge and power.”11 In the end, while Porter offered no solid definition of madness, so it remains
the responsibility of other scholars and readers to glean what he thought about madness through the
actual history itself.
In a way, Foucault and his followers are largely at fault for the nuances and unknowns towards a
concept for madness due to the widespread success and subsequent critiques of his focus on institutional
confinement, epistemic breaks in historical knowledge, and his “idealization” of the Middle Ages. These
are particularly evident in his misuse of geographical barriers concerning the perception madness,
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causing a narrowed view of France being a much larger player in the discourse than most other
historians would view amongst the larger Western European background.12 As such, how can one take
the past historiography and theories about madness seriously if the historians themselves cannot take an
argumentative stance towards madness, which is evident in Roy Porter’s complete denial of a strict
concept for madness and Foucault’s flawed arguments.13 In my opinion, and as other historians would
stand strongly by me, no acclaimed historian has yet made a complete and satisfactory argument for a
concept surrounding madness and the subsequent societal relationships that stem from the mad’s place
in human civilization.14
In this same way, the history of madness is littered with stories of reason’s “progressive
conquest” and the consistent, everlasting repression of anything that opposes the normality that is
reason.15 Foucault and Porter have done enough to nuance and over-complicate the concepts of madness
that most historians would blindly follow in attempts to further nuance and make their own. The
problem of defining madness in this way, as most modern historians tend to do, is that it further distorts
rather than clarifies a concept that is already confusing enough to the very people that apply a
derogatory term and punishments to a mental or medical condition that they do not understand.16 On top
of all this, it is—or at least should be—widely accepted that the western construction of madness is
specific to its own worldview, exemplified by the development of Enlightenment reason, science,
inductive logic, and an inherently reductionist reality.17 As I begin to construct the history of paradigm
changes concerning the creation of a concept for madness and the subsequent societal relationships that
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develop from these changes, I will eventually come back to this question of whether a historian can
reasonably define or universally agree on a concept for madness and what that might even look like
considering the aforementioned parameters, present historiography, and the overall research within this
paper.
Classical Theory and Hippocratic Medicine (5th-4th c. BCE)
It has often been argued that a human concept of “madness” might be as old as man itself.18 19 20
For, as far back as our discoveries of ancient human remains go, archaeologists have found skulls with
holes bored in the tops of them, most likely made by stone tools, which would subsequently date them
back thousands of years.21 This was mentioned
as such earlier in the paper. Historical
researchers and archaeologists have thought of
no reason why this kind of experimentation
with madness could not have gone further back
in human history. Along these same lines, many
scholars claim that understandings and
conceptions madness can indeed be argued to
have existed for centuries within early religious dialogue, such as Old Testament stories concerning
people like Nebuchadnezzar. In his case, Nebuchadnezzar was cursed by the gods for burning down a
Jewish temple in 6th century BCE, causing him to go mad. He “did eat grass like oxen, and his body
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was wet with the dew of heaven, until his hairs were grown like eagles’ feathers, and his nails like birds’
claws.22
I argue that there was not a sufficient concept being researched and argued towards the
understanding of madness until the scientific and medical research—however correct or incorrect—that
was accomplished with the Hippocratic Corpus in Classical Greece. What makes the Greek
understanding of madness unique was the deliberate attempt to place madness in the same vein as
disease and other physiological issues, to place it in direct relation to the body and the human mind.
Writers within the corpus began to understand madness as a disease stemming from complications
within the human body itself as opposed to being divinely-struck or mystically appearing seemingly out
of nowhere as previous concepts had shown. This new way of understanding madness subverted the
aforementioned methods by attempting to completely understand madness as opposed to applying the
same argument of “divine punishment” that stemmed from most medical diagnoses before the advent of
Hippocratic medicine. As such, I argue that for the reasons listed above, the Hippocratic concept
represents the first major shift in the paradigm changes of perceptions surrounding madness that this
paper is concerned with.
Hippocratic methods set the stage for mainstream western medicine, with some methods such as
the humoral understanding of the human body perpetuating even into the 19th and early 20th centuries
when what we know as modern medical practices began to arise.23 While scholars are unsure how
madness fits into the Hippocratic Corpus in early writings, I believe the first direct encounters with
madness can be attributed to writing on “The Sacred Disease.”24 This was the Hippocratic way of
bridging previous ideas of divinely struck madness and both Greek medical and scientific
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understandings of how the mind works in conjunction with the rest of the body.25 In this way, the brain
began to be seen as the center of mental activity. This was the first major sign of a paradigm shift in
belief as previous religious ideas of mental activity centered around how the supernatural deity affects a
person directly.26 The idea of the Sacred Disease denied that a god can pollute the body, and this disease
stems from an imbalance in the humors, a typical explanation for Hippocratic medicine.27
If taking a poststructuralist lens to this era of paradigm change, the corpus inspired the first
attempts to build other words and visual concepts around “madness” in the Greek lexicon. Words like
“mania,” and other Greek counterparts such as “menos,” “oistros,” and “lyssa,” appeared during this era
and persisted throughout recorded history moving forward in the discourse.28 Along with the beginning
of a more complex lexicology, visual representations in creative pottery vase-painting became widely
popular in 5th century BCE Greek culture. Generally symbolized in the image of gods such as Dionysis,
madness was sometimes represented and referred to as “Dionysiac frenzy.” In this case, we see the first
socially constructed concepts of madness in that Dionysiac frenzy was the manic state of “personal
alienation from accepted social and political conduct.”29 Just as well, and a relatively worrying fact for
future perceptions of madness, 5th century BCE vase painting began to show violent tendencies in the
mad with images of Dionysis tearing apart animals in a frenzy or Lykourgos killing his son and
watching his dead body.30
More important than the paradigm change itself were the effects that this explanation of the
Sacred Disease had on future understandings of madness. The symptoms and medical explanations
given for the disease set the framework for how future western thought viewed madness. These
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symptoms included, but were not limited to, loss of voice, choking, foaming at the mouth, clenching of
the teeth, convulsive movements, and otherwise confusion of the mind.31 While previous ideas of
madness included these symptoms, the medical explanations in the Hippocratic Corpus finally applied
the symptoms directly to medical conflicts inside the body directly between the brain and other organs in
the form of humoral imbalance.32 All of this culminated in a complete change-of-pace in the medical
world, the first paradigm change of how humanity views madness as a concept and phenomenon. What
was to come, however, would be a societal turn and subsequent paradigm change against the mad.
Bridge Period and Mix Between the Divine and the Hippocratic Explanations (1st-16th c. CE)
While Christian societies in Western
Europe honored Hippocratic medicine due
to its traditionally widespread use and
understanding, throughout many centuries
following the beginning of the common era
these same societies began to mix traditional
Hippocratic medicine with previous
religious beliefs that were thought to have fizzled out in the 4th and 5th centuries BCE.33 This era,
though occurring over many centuries until the Enlightenment, represents the second great paradigm
shift in the perception of madness due to widespread returning beliefs that madness was divinely struck,
thereby opposing the Hippocratic beliefs that had previously denied any polluting interference from
deities.
As the common era continued along, traditional Hippocratic medical beliefs seemed to lose their
shine. As Roy Porter explains, “Simplified Christian learning was intermingled with folk beliefs and
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magical [supernatural] remedies.”34 Part of this was due to the obvious fall of the previously influential
empires and the rise of new, so-called “Successor States” developing their societies along what they
know best: faith in God(s).35 Melancholy and mania began to be explained by a mixture of an imbalance
in the humors and divinely struck punishment, if you will, by the God(s) of a given society. Another
cause of the aforementioned change was the turn towards viewing madness as “unreason” as opposed to
society not being able to pinpoint what exactly the dangers of madness were.36 Just as well, a major
feature of this paradigm change was the shift in mindset for how one can care for the mad. To societies
during this long era of change, it is rather jaded as to what kind of care the mad need and how much
responsibility those who are normal and rational should even have. As a result, society began to turn
away from the mad because they did not understand it, which opposed previous Hippocratic beliefs that
the mad should be studied and dealt with medically.
It would be impossible to track the long history of every source that represents this paradigm
change. In an effort to subvert tracking hundreds “madness” cases while staying within the
periodization, it is helpful to give two specific examples in which this paradigm change—particularly
the fact that society had turned away from the mad—is most rife within the given period. One example
of how medieval society—especially in the 14th to 15th centuries—dealt with the mad in the case of
Emma de Beston, a well documented and lengthy British court battle in 1383 that was meant to assess
de Beston’s state of mind to prove whether she was mad and needed further treatment. This case went
back-and-forth with the court deciding that she was mentally sane, yet unstable. They inquired into
different factors of her life such as how she interacted with neighbors, sleep patterns, general
intelligence, and other questions to test if she was of “sound mind.”37 The various judges decided on the
34

Ibid., 49.
Andrew Scull, Madness in Civilization: A Cultural History of Insanity from the Bible to Freud, from the Madhouse to
Modern Medicine (London: Thames & Hudson, 2015), 48.
36
Roy Porter, Madness: A Brief History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 50.
37
Christine Roffe and David Roffe, “Madness and Care in the Community: A Medieval Perspective,” British Medical
Journal 311, no. 7021 (December 1995): 1708.
35

Cecil 15

state of her mind based on whether she exhibited signs of divinely struck lunacy in the aforementioned
aspects of her life. These included, but were not limited to, convulsions, misunderstanding of general
societal truths like how much currency is worth, and how she saw herself fitting into society as an
individual, which was shown by her arrogance or lack thereof in connection to her innocence.
Inevitably, de Beston was declared mad and had her personal capital and belongings stripped away from
her entirely.38
This was generally the way that medieval societies throughout Western Europe operated. Along
with the removal of capital, protocol and precedence dictated that the declared was to be on house-arrest,
shut away from society so that they may not be a danger or influence—perhaps infect—others with their
madness.39 This case of medieval society proves how different the perspectives towards madness were
during this era compared to when Hippocratic medicine dominated the medical world. The courts would
forcibly make the mad stay on house-arrest with their families watching over them out of fear that the
mad would roam and inflict damage to society. However, this blind perspective did not create or enforce
some kind of shadow hierarchy with underlying power relations as some poststructuralist scholars like
Foucault might argue.40
The second of the two examples best represents how Hippocratic and religious ideas about
madness mixed in this era. Tommaso Campanella was imprisoned and tortured for 27 consecutive years
starting in November of 1599 while on trial for heresy in his supposed “madness” by the Inquisition.41
More important than Campanella himself and his case was the fact that the Inquisition began to show
society’s view that madness is “animality” and “unreason,” a point that had previously been attributed to
humoral imbalance and/or divine punishment.42 An idea begins to appear here that would perpetuate and
38
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further develop through the final two eras of paradigm change that are discussed later in this paper. This
idea was that “the madman was not a sick man,” rather he was a beast, the epitome of animality within a
human.43 This new idea was upheld and developed because of the shifting ideals within the mixing
period that saw less validity in just religious or Hippocratic ideals and more validity into new hybrid
thoughts that combined aspects of the two. Namely, these were the idea that madness should be shut
away and avoided, in Emma de Beston’s case and the more religious argument, and madness should also
be viewed as something concrete and actually wrong with a human or their human nature, in
Campanella’s case and the more Hippocratic argument. Upon looking closely, one can see how similar
Foucault’s examples of the supposed “madmen” were to Emma and Campanella in that they were never
truly proved to be mad by the sense of the word that one might understand. However, for their
differences, they were ostracized anyways.
Towards the end of the 16th century, just before Enlightenment ideals began to replace Medieval
ones concerning long-held beliefs about madness, a different and unique development in dealing directly
with the mad began to arise in Medieval France, Germany, and England that would inevitably spell the
beginning of Enlightenment institutionalization of the mad. Historians like Michel Foucault argued for
the theory that Medieval and Feudal societies hastily rid themselves of the mad; take the “Ship of Fools”
for example.44 In this way, and rather tepidly as historian of Medieval Europe Erik Midelfort describes
it, the mad began to be kept in both protective custody in homes and also converted monasteries that
worked as homes for the mad whose families refused to keep them. The asylums that would become
infamous during the Enlightenment—which is discussed later—were generally founded out these
monasteries that had begun to accept, only on a voluntary basis, mad individuals that were willing to do
honest work in exchange for being taken care of with plenty of fine foods, beer, fresh water, and a clear
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mental space with a welcoming environment.45 Only due to a shift and schism in Enlightenment
reasoning do the mental “institutions” of Foucault’s nightmares ever arrive, which led many historians
like Midelfort and later, more famous scholars like Roy Porter to deny Foucault’s ideas about the “Great
Confinement,” because they were generally based on incorrect facts, historical errors, and temporal
confusion in Foucault’s apparently jaded research. To this end, the Enlightenment brought a newfound
schism on how madness was viewed and dealt with between scholars that now began to directly
associate with the mad, for better or for worse.46
Enlightenment Unification Behind Reason, and the First “Schism”(17th-19th c. CE)
The Enlightenment—if we allow for some time leading up to its start and even after its supposed
end, particularly the 17th to 19th centuries—was the most transcendent era for paradigm change in the
creation and perception of madness as a concept. Here, I will discuss this change and its subsequent
wide-ranging implications across the discourse in-depth. There was first an initial unification of scholars
behind reason and logic that led to a
new perception of madness away from
the confused mix that had remained
until the 16th century. There was then
a schism amongst scholars during the
Enlightenment that caused about half
of scholars within the discourse of madness to revert to Hippocratic thought that madness was disease
and needed to be gently treated and helped, while the other half saw through the lens perpetuated by the
aforementioned Inquisition-like thought that madness symbolizes dangerous, animalistic unreason.
Finally, there was the development of mental hospitals and mental asylums that aligned with the two
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halves of scholarly thought towards madness with the hospitals serving and attempting to heal those who
were seen as being disease and the asylums institutionalizing and experimenting on those who were seen
to be dangerous and animalistic. These two sides would continue even into our modern day with the new
psychiatric age that I discuss later in the paper.
Although renowned French philosopher Rene Descartes preceded the Enlightenment by a
half-century, his ideas about madness seemed to set the stage for this era’s great paradigm change.
Famously, Descartes’ argument was the topic of a decade-long debate about madness between Michel
Foucault and Jacques Derrida, two of the most pivotal figures in 20th-century historical and
philosophical academia. Of the most important points in Descartes’ ideas about madness was his belief
that there was no distinction between madness and reason, whereas the previous era discussed above
contained budding beliefs that madness was dangerous and represented animalistic traits in man.47 In a
way, Descartes believed that madness was no more than hidden reason masked by violent side effects. If
anything, the mad were to be studied and understood, particularly their dreams, as they had gained
knowledge by being mad that normal, reasonable people could never receive.48 While the Enlightenment
highlighted the importance and value of reason, it was Descartes’ refusal to make a distinction between
madness and reason that originally laid the foundation of Enlightenment thought towards madness.
Descartes’ theories about madness reunified thought amongst Enlightenment scholars from the end of
the 17th century to the beginning of the 18th century that was previously lacking in the aforementioned
“mixed” period where madness was viewed as both positive and negative.
At the beginning of the 18th century, and as Descartes ideas began to fade from the minds of
scholars, what I refer to as the “Enlightenment Schism” took place amongst scholars concerned with
madness. Approximately half of these scholars stayed true to Descartes’ ideas and Hippocratic morality
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that madness is something to be studied, cured, and cared for, whereas the other half of scholars turned
away from these ideas and back towards old religious thought that plagued the “mixed” period.49
However, it was no longer mixed where scholars could believe both at the same time, rather it was a
period of complete intellectual conflict. Each side’s supposed solution to the problem of madness
represents these thoughts, and thus I will discuss their subsequent response to each other.
In coming to terms with madness, the Descartes-inspired scholars sought curable methods of care
for the mad. In the lexicology of creating madness during this period, we begin to see the “diminished
status of mental illness” taking the place of negative concepts for madness, a landmark point in the
changing vocabulary that persists in the modern world.50 A relative continuation of something like
Emma de Beston’s “punishment” followed this new status of madness. The mad would be cared for in
the home, sent to hospital-like monasteries, or studied inside of mental institutions. These were unlike
what I will discuss in a paragraph below with the asylums, rather these institutions were similar to
hospitals where the subject could be watched, treated, and kept in a state that was not harmful to
themselves or society. However, the most noticeable difference between this approach and the more
negative one that I will discuss soon is the mindset that scholars and researchers took towards the mad.
In these people’s eyes, the mad were victims of a disease. To them, madness was pathological and
worthy of care.51 Close one-on-one contact with the mad was utilized to treat specific mental illnesses,
and interpersonal communication between researcher or doctor and patient became the leading method
of dealing with madness.52
While one side of scholars and researchers took a caring hand to mental illness, the other side
was not so understanding and curious about curing. Rather, the creation of mental asylums became a
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solution in which the mad could be imprisoned, scrupulously experimented on, and dealt with away
from the prying and caring eyes of society’s understanding people.53 To this side of scholars, the mad
were “wild beasts” prone to dangerous, violent tendencies that required “brutal taming” to protect
society.54 Particularly evident in English institutions such as Bethlem and St. Luke’s Asylum,
researchers encouraged and practiced psychological bullying, bloodletting, lobotomizations, and routine
experimental medications.55 These asylums got away with these horrible and gruesome forms of torture
by claiming that they were developing “moral therapy,” that is emphasizing structured community life
while applying methods of gently reconditioning behavior. In this way, madness was clearly being
viewed as the “other,” something wholly different and unable to be understood by rational minds of
society, and in many cases it is something entirely dangerous to society as well.56
These two sides represented the Enlightenment schism that I place so much emphasis on within
this paper. While they may seem simple enough to understand, these two sides of Enlightenment thought
established the framework for modern ideas towards madness that would persist into our modern day
world. The idea of tragic knowledge arose out of sentiments towards madness in which the very term
evokes fear of what comes from the mad. While there was a unification of “reason” in the
enlightenment, it was also a point in which scholars became divided on the issue, thus some believing
madness to be a harmless disease needed to be researched and treated with care and some believing
madness to be a dangerous form of tragic knowledge that could perhaps corrupt reason and normality.57
If the Hippocratic Corpus and subsequent “mixed” period developed structured ideas and concepts for
madness, this Enlightenment period completely turned the discourse on its head and rewrote ideas about
madness with actual, physical action. There was no more theorizing or humoral medical methods
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employed, rather these two sides knew for a fact what the mad were—in their minds—and set in stone
ideas about madness that most western societies still believe today.
Psychiatric Ideals, Modern Psychology, and Psychotropic Medicine (20th-21st c. CE)
The “Age of Psychotropic Medicine,” as it has been called by some scholars within medical
discourses, perpetuated Enlightenment ideals that resulted in a schism between the two competing
perceptions of madness. Likewise, Western European society of the 20th to 21st century has begun to
lean on psychology, therapy, and psychotropic medicine—that is, drugs that affect the mind and
psychology directly—in efforts to either subvert or cure madness, or mental illness as it is called today.
However, the cases have remained the same in how society perceives and deals directly with was we
know as madness. Enlightenment ideals on both sides have persevered amongst ancient ideas, but they
are now found both within caring methods of psychological therapy and assistance under the diminished
status of “mental illness,” while also within typical methods of shutting away or institutionalizing
“insanity” and “madness” with psychotropic medicine and modern institutions that act as asylums.58
It is difficult to tell nowadays how society views madness. Psychological institutions and
psychologists or psychiatrists themselves claim to care for those with mental illness. They seemingly
seek to help and heal those who have gone mad, and while “madness” is not a term that is often used
anymore, it seems as though
society still treats them as such.
The rise of Somatic psychiatry,
that is the idea that mental
illness can be cured through
psychotropic therapy and
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medical drugs due to its direct association with the brain, originally emerged from these confused
modern ideas about mental illness in the late 19th century but most heavily in the early 20th century.59
Since then, thoughts towards mental illness have been more concerned with what went wrong in a
person’s mind as opposed to methods of cure.60 In this way, society has strayed yet again from
Descartian ideas of caring for the mad. We can look at the thousands of modern focus groups, millions
of psychiatric therapists, and countless supposed “quick cures” for mental illness, but the truth is, the
other side of asylum autocrats has won out.
The “Big Pharma Revolution” of psychotropic medicine has replaced the asylums of old in the
way that most psychologists and psychiatrists, but not all, choose to blindly medicate instead of treating
those with mental illness.61 This all stems from a paradigm shift in reasoning that mental illness
represents a “crisis of meaning,” and in a way the people pushing these forms of treatment enable this
renewed feeling that madness is something to be tossed away, checked, and brutally dealt with to avoid
further harm to the rest of society.62 I believe that they view mental disorders as exactly that: dis-order.
While not all of western society is guilty of such a belief, it can be generally stated that this push for
psychotropic medicine is representative of wanting a quick fix without much effort, simply because
people cannot and have not been able to understand madness for millenia. This is truly where one can
view the idea starting to permanently emerge that mental illness should be shut away. In this way,
modern psychology is no better than the asylums and prisons meant to entrap and hold the mad so they
do not harm society.
My Attempt at a Structured Concept for Madness
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Renowned post-Enlightenment German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel gave what I
believe to be a perfect description of how human society struggles to cope with even the most basic
concept surrounding madness. He argued that human society is a divided one which enables “the
phenomena of madness … to reveal [the] human struggle with guilt and the nature of evil.”63 In essence,
and at the very least how I have come to understand this, we—as humans—allow ourselves to fear
madness and enable it to become something inherently different from us. Fear of the unknown is one of
the primary reasons for tens, hundreds, thousands of atrocities, sentiments of indifference, political
division, and so much more. Madness is in no way any different in the manner that the natural, inherent
desires of normality within the human worldview causes all of us to push aside that which pushes back
against the safe, comforting “normal”. In this way, all of these historians that for five-plus decades since
the blossoming of the discourse with Foucault’s writings have over complicated and nuanced so simple
of a concept to understand the relationship between human society and the mad.
In this way, and as crazy as it may appear, Foucault remains the scholar who comes closest to
being correct in his understanding of why society perceives and defines madness in the various ways that
it does. However, I modify this with the underlying truth that somewhat encompasses aspects of all the
important scholarly theories on the matter; at its core, I truly believe that ‘madness’ can be viewed as a
wide-ranging societal battle of ‘reason’ against ‘unreason’. In layman’s terms, it is a perpetual conflict
between what we know and what we do not. Similarly to Southeast Asian historian Edward Said’s
theory of orientalism, the ‘orient’ was inherently differentiated from the ‘normal’ as a way for society to,
in a way, snuff out or push aside what they do not understand. It is in our very nature as humans and
always has been. Most modern mental “institutions”—be it asylums, homes for the mentally ill, prisons,
and even the metaphorical institutions of psychotropic medication—still do not accomplish their goals
of rehabilitation. Rather, they lock away prisoners for long periods of time in a structured, closed-off
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lifestyle completely removed from the public eye as a way to separate and hide what society cannot cope
with. I view this battle of reason and unreason in the very same light.
Where I differ from Foucault is in my belief that madness has always been more a problem of
mental health and social functioning as opposed to an issue in power relations as Foucault and his fellow
post-structuralists might argue. Instead, I view it as the so-called “rational” people fearing the possible
dangers that mental unreason may pose,
which is a product of many things
including long-held beliefs that
normality is the only correct mental
state.64 Identifying and enforcing
societal structure against madness and
the mad themselves is not inherently an
oppressive act, rather it is one of fear
towards the unknown.65 It could be
argued in this way that madness is not a
societal construct, as Foucault might argue, but instead it is a human construct.66 Likewise, it could also
be seen as the hermeneutics of a crisis of identity, of subconsciously not knowing who we are or at least
being uncomfortable with any kind of identity at all.67 Poststructuralist thinkers would argue for a
process of “meaning-making” in society, but I just do not see it with that much complexity.68 In the end,
I believe it is simple. We—as humans—have the inherent desire to set ourselves apart from what makes
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us different, what we inherently fear, which has created this entire dichotomy between reason and
unreason.
It is within cases like Emma de Beston’s, those struck with the “sacred disease,” and millions of
other victims throughout the recorded history of Western Europe that we find this argument in action.
Humans, even in phenomenon not including madness, have always autonomously shut away that which
they do not understand. At some point in history, humanity has lost the logic and reason that it gained
through those Enlightenment thinkers that stood content to understanding madness instead of most other
thinkers that wished to lock the metaphorical jail and throw away the key. Scholars like Porter and
Foucault have nuanced our understanding of humanity’s treatments towards madness so much that it
becomes confusing and jaded to those wondering how and why madness has been dealt throughout
history in the aforementioned ways. There is some fear amongst myself and other scholars that because
of this forgetful attitude, Foucault may be correct and Porter might be wrong that madness will be
completely forgotten to humanity at some point. Either those people will be forcefully assimilated into
society or medicated and shut away to a point where madness no longer exists altogether; at least on the
surface, it does not exist. However, that is exactly what makes this realization so important, as Madness
is simple, black-and-white. Our treatment of it is subsequently clear in that we, as humans, fear and turn
away from that which is inherently different, the “other.” While I have hope for the future, this simple
reality will seemingly stay a perpetual truth of human society.
Concluding Thoughts
Through all of this research, I have come down to the solid and unwavering opinion that it has
forever been inherently within human nature to battle against the unknown in a conflict and dichotomy
of ‘reason’ opposing ‘unreason’. While I cannot speak for modern psychiatry and psychotropic medical
practices, I believe that Foucault comes close - just missing the mark - to the true answer as to why
western society has stigmatized madness in the various ways that it has throughout recorded history.
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All-in-all, I believe madness to be not a social construct, but rather a human construct built from fear of
the unknown and the everlasting, egotistical idea that ‘madness’ forever opposes a supposed and
foundational ‘normality’. I believe the two primary reasons for a lack of scholarship on madness are
people’s fear of the unknown, nearly inexplicable concept of madness itself and an inherent human
wonder as to why researching something as jaded and impossible to explain as madness is useful to the
overall field of history.
To this, I would argue that it is a natural sense of desire to explore the history of those without a
voice. Just as in gender and sexuality history, people without a voice in history may be eventually be lost
to time if not scrupulously studied and queried. In this way, I saw madness as the perfect subject to give
people a voice, because in many cases they had no voice; being shut away and ignored for nearly all of
recorded history, be it declared the “other” in society and subsequently ostracized, shut away in asylums,
or medicated and told to be at peace with having a so-called “mental illness”. It should be the prime goal
of the historian to not only give these people a voice, but get down to the brass tacks of how and why
they have been marginalized throughout history and what this says about societal relationships between
them and those who are considered normal. With that said, I believe this paper justly attempts to give a
voice to the mad’s history; or at the very least explores and reveals the marginalization that has occurred
throughout recorded history in an effort to recognize the mad themselves instead of shutting them away
as society has done for centuries. To all future historians, I might echo fellow authors within the
discourse by asking: how can we know where reason stops and madness begins?69 Madness and reason
are, after all, inextricably linked because one is the absence or “other” of thought and one is the
supposed epitome of normality. How might we ever tell the difference if the future of the discourse
continues to prevent the mad from regaining their own freedom?70
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